The Moral Sensitivity of Gifted Children and the …
Here Kant entertains doubts about how a priori knowledge of anintelligible world would be possible. The position of the InauguralDissertation is that the intelligible world is independent of the humanunderstanding and of the sensible world, both of which (in differentways) conform to the intelligible world. But, leaving aside questionsabout what it means for the sensible world to conform to anintelligible world, how is it possible for the human understanding toconform to or grasp an intelligible world? If the intelligible world isindependent of our understanding, then it seems that we could grasp itonly if we are passively affected by it in some way. But for Kantsensibility is our passive or receptive capacity to be affected byobjects that are independent of us (2:392, A51/B75). So the only way wecould grasp an intelligible world that is independent of us is throughsensibility, which means that our knowledge of it could not be apriori. The pure understanding alone could at best enable us to formrepresentations of an intelligible world. But since these intellectualrepresentations would entirely “depend on our inner activity,” as Kantsays to Herz, we have no good reason to believe that they conform to anindependent intelligible world. Such a priori intellectualrepresentations could well be figments of the brain that do notcorrespond to anything independent of the human mind. In any case, itis completely mysterious how there might come to be a correspondencebetween purely intellectual representations and an independentintelligible world.
On the Natural Foundations of Moral Judgment.
Emotion characterizes a moral judgments
Religion, by providing the mind with a clear and precise solution to a great number of metaphysical and moral questions as important as they are difficult to resolve, leaves the mind the strength and the leisure to proceed with calmness and with energy in the whole area that religion abandons to it; and it is not precisely because of religion, but with the help of the liberty and the peace that religion gained for it, that the human mind has often done such great things in the centuries of faith.]
taking the standpoint of moral judgment…
The word for such politics -- Terror -- is borrowed from similar policies during the French Revolution, when Robespierre forthrightly asserted that the Terror was the direct manifestation of Virtue: "Terror is naught but prompt, severe, inflexible justice; it is therefore an emanation of virtue."An example of similar principles invading a liberal society, and of a clash between political moralism and aestheticism, is the continuing debate in over its longstanding tendency to reject any personal or traditional cultural emphasis on female beauty, regarding it as a devaluation, belittlement, or "objectification" of women, or at least as a distraction from worthy purposes.